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ABSTRACT
Contextual understanding depends on a reader's ability
to correctly infer a context within which to interpret the
events in a story. This "context-selection problem" has
traditionally been expressed in terms of heuristics for
making the correct initial selection of a story context.
This paper presents a view of context selection as an
ongoing process spread throughout the understanding process.
This view requires that the understander be capable of
recognizing and correcting erroneous initial context
inferences, A computer program called ARTHUR is described,
which selects the correct context for a story by dynamically
re-evaluating its own initial inferences in light of
subsequent information in a story.
1.0 INTRODUCTION
Consider the following simple story:
[1] Geoffrey Huggins walked into the Roger Sherman
movie theater. He went up to the balcony, where
Willy North was waiting with a gram of cocaine.
Geoff paid Willy in large bills and left quickly.
Why did Geoff go into the movie theater? Most people infer
that he did so in order to buy some coke, since that was the
outcome of the story. The alternative possibility, that
Geoff went to the theater to see a movie and then
coincidentally ran into Willy and decided to buy some coke
from him, seems to go virtually unnoticed by most readers in
informal experiments. On the basis of pure logic, either of
these inferences is equally plausible. However, people
overwhelmingly choose the first inference to explain this
story, maintaining that Geoff did not go into the theater to
see a movie.
The problem is that the most plausible initial
inference from the story's first sentence is that Geoff did
go inside to see a movie. Hence, selection of the correct
inference about Geoff's goal in this story requires
rejection of this initial inference. This paper describes a
program called ARTHUR (A Reader THat Understands
Reflectively) which understands stories like [1] by
generating tentative initial context inferences and then
re-evaluating its own inferences in light of subsequent
information in the story. By this process ARTHUR
understands misleading and surprising stories, and expresses
its surprise in English. For example, from the above story,
ARTHUR answers the following question about Geoff's
intentions:
Q) Why did Geoff go into the movie theater?
A) AT FIRST I THOUGHT IT WAS BECAUSE HE WANTED TO WATCH
A MOVIE, BUT ACTUALLY IT'S BECAUSE HE WANTED TO
BUY COCAINE.
(For a much more complete description of ARTHUR, see Granger
[1980]).
We call the problem of finding the correct inference in
a story the "context-selection problem" (after the
"script-selection problem" in Cullingford [1978] and Dejong
[1979], which is a special case (see Section 4.2)). All the
"contexts" (or "context inferences") referred to in this
paper are goals, plans or scripts, aS presented by Schank
and Abelson [1977]. Other theories of contextual
understanding (Charniak [1972], Schank [1973], Wilks [1975],
Schank and Abelson [1977], Cullingford [1978], Wilensky
[1978]) involve the selection of a context which is then,
used to interpret subsequent events in the story, but these
theories fail to understand stories such as [1], in which
the initially selected context turns out to be incorrect.
ARTHUR operates by maintaining an "inference-fate graph",
containing the tentative inferences generated during story
processing, along with information about the current status
of each inference.
2.0 BACKGROUND: SCRIPTS PLANS GOALS & UNDERSTANDING
2.1 Contextual understanding
ARTHUR'S representational scheme is adopted from Schank
and Abelson's [1977] framework for representing human
intentions (goals) and methods of achieving those goals
(plans and scripts). The problem ARTHUR addresses is the
process by which a given story representation is generated
from a story. It will be seen that this process of mapping
a story onto a representation is not straightforward, and
may involve the generation of a number of intermediate
representations which are discarded by the time the final
story representation is complete.
Recall the first sentence of story [1]: "Geoffrey
Huggins walked into the Roger Sherman movie theater."
ARTHUR'S attempt to infer a context for this event is based
on knowledge of typical functions associated with objects
and locations. In this instance, a movie theater is a known
location with an associated "scripty" activity: viewing a
movie. Hence, whenever a story character goes to such a
location, one of the plausible inferences from this action
is that the character may intend to perform this activity.
Seeing a movie also has a default goal associated with it:
being entertained. Thus, ARTHUR infers that Geoff plans to
see a movie to entertain himself.
When the next sentence is read, "He went up to the
balcony, where Willy North was waiting with a gram of
cocaine", ARTHUR again performs this bottom-up inference
process, resulting in the inference that Geoff may have been
planning to take part in a drug sale. Now ARTHUR attempts
to connect this inference with the previously inferred goal
of watching a movie for entertainment. Now, however, ARTHUR
fails to find a connection between the goal of wanting to
see a movie and the action of meeting a cocaine dealer.
Understanding the story requires ARTHUR to resolve this
connection failure.
2.2 Cocygdtihg 311 erroneous inference
Having failed to specify a connecting inferential path
between the initial goal and the new action, ARTHUR
generates an alternative goal inference from the action. In
this case, the new inference is that Geoff wanted to
entertain himself by intoxicating himself with cocaine.
(Note that this inference too is only a tentative inference,
and could be supplanted if it failed to account for the
other events in the story.) ARTHUR now has a disconnected
representation for the story so far; it has generated two
separate goal inferences to explain Geoff's two actions.
ARTHUR thinks that Geoff went to the theater in order to see
a movie, but that he then met up with Willy in order to buy
some coke. This is not an adequate representation for the
story at this point. The correct representation would
indicate that Geoff performed both of his actions in service
of a single goal of getting coke, and that he never intended
to see a movie there at all; the theater was just a meeting
place.
Hence, ARTHUR instead infers that Geoff's action of
going into the theater was in service of the newly inferred
goal, and discards the initial inference (wanting to see a
movie) which previously explained this action. We call this
process supplanting an inference: ARTHUR supplants its
initial "see-movie" inference by the new "get-coke"
inference, as the explanation for Geoff's two actions.
ARTHUR'S representation of the story now consists of a
single inference about Geoff's intentions (he wanted to
acquire some coke) and two plans performed in service of
that goal (getting to the movie theater and getting to
Willy), each of which was carried out by a physical action
(PTRANSing to the theater and PTRANSing to Willy). At this
point, the initial goal inference (that Geoff wanted to see
a movie) has been supplanted: it is no longer considered to
be a valid inference about Geoff's intentions in light of
the events in the story.
3.0 OPERATION OF THE ARTHUR PROGRAM
3.1 Annotated run-time output
The following represents actual annotated run-time
output of the ARTHUR program. The input to the program is
the following deceptively simple story;
[2] Mary picked up a magazine. She swatted a fly.
The first sentence causes ARTHUR to generate the plausible
inference that Mary plans to read the magazine for
entertainment, since that is stored in ARTHUR'S memory as
the default use for a magazine. ARTHUR'S internal
representation of this Situation consists of an "explanation
triple": a goal (being entertained), an event (picking up
the magazine), and an inferential path connecting the event
and goal (reading the magazine). The following ARTHUR
output is generated from the processing of the second
sentence. (ARTHUR'S output has been shortened and
simplified here for pedagogical and financial reasons.)
:CURRENT EXPLANATION-GRAPH:
GOAL: (E-ENTERTAIN (PLANNER MARY) (OBJECT MAG))
EVO: (GRASP (ACTOR MARY) (OBJECT MAG))
PATHO: (READ (PLANNER MARY) (OBJECT MAG))
ARTHUR'S explanation of the first sentence has
a goal (being ENTERTAINed), an act (GRASPing
a magazine) and an inferential path connecting
the action and goal (READing the magazine).
:NEXT SENTENCE CD:
(PROPEL (ACTOR MARY) (OBJECT NIL) (TO FLY))
The Conceptual Dependency for Mary's action;
she struck a fly with an unknown object.
:FAILURE TO CONNECT TO EXISTING GOAL CONTEXT;
ARTHUR'S initial goal inference (Mary planned
to entertain herself by reading the magazine)
fails to explain her action of swatting a fly.
:SUPPLANTING WITH NEW PLAUSIBLE GOAL CONTEXT:
(PHYS-STATE (PLANNER MARY) (OBJECT MAG) (VAL -10))
ARTHUR now generates an alternative goal on the
basis of Mary's new action: she may want to
destroy the fly, i.e., want its physical state
to be -10. This new goal also serves to explain
her previous action (getting a magazine) as a
precondition to the action of swatting the fly,
once ARTHUR infers that the magazine was the
INSTRument in Mary's plan to damage the fly.
:FINAL EXPLANATION-TRIPLE!
GOALl: (PHYS-STATE
(PLANNER MARY) (OBJECT FLY) (VAL -10))
EVl: (GRASP (ACTOR MARY) (OBJECT MAG))
PATHl: (DELTA-CONTROL (PLANNER MARY) (OBJECT MAG)
EV2: (PROPEL (ACTOR MARY) (OBJECT MAG) (TO FLY))
PATH2! (CHANGE-PHYS-STATE (PLANNER MARY)
(OBJECT FLY) (DIRECTION NEG) (INSTR MAG))
This representation says that Mary wanted to
destroy a fly (GOALl), so she planned to damage
it (PATH2). Her first step in doing so was to
get an instrumental object (PATHl), These two
plans were realized (Events lr2) by her picking
up a magazine and hitting the fly with it.
:READY FOR QUESTIONS:
>Why did Mary pick up a magazine?
AT FIRST I THOUGHT IT WAS BECAUSE SHE WANTED TO
READ IT, BUT ACTUALLY IT'S BECAUSE SHE WANTED TO
USE IT TO GET RID OF A FLY.
The question asks for the inferred goal under
lying Mary's action of GRASPing the magazine.
This answer is generated according to ARTHUR'S
supplanted inference about the action (READ)
and the active inference about the action
(CHANGE-PHYS-STATE). The English generation
mechanism used is described in Granger [1980].
3.2 The parsimony principle
ARTHUR'S answer as given above is not the only possible
interpretation of the story; it is only one of the
following three alternatives, all of which are valid on the
basis of what the story says:
(2a) Mary picked up a magazine to read it. She then
was annoyed by a fly, and she swatted it with the
magazine she was holding.
(2b) Mary picked up a magazine to read it. She then
was annoyed by a fly, and she swatted it with a
flyswatter that was handy.
(2c) Mary picked up a magazine to swat a fly with it.
The last interpretation (2c) reflects a story representation
which consists of a single goal, getting rid of a fly, which
both of Mary's actions were performed in service of. The
other interpretations both consist of two separate goals,
each of which explains one of Mary's actions.
In [2], as in [1], the interpretation generated by the
reader is the most parsimonious of the possible
interpretations. That is, the preferred interpretation is
the one in which the fewest number of inferred goals of a
story character account for the maximum number of his
actions. We summarize this observation in the following
principles
The Parsimony Principle
The best context inference is the one which
accents for the most actions of a story character.
In other words, the decision to replace a previous
inference by a new one is not based on the explicit
contradiction of that inference by subsequent information in
the story. Example [2], for instance, has three possible
interpretations, none of which can be ruled out on strictly
logical grounds. Rather, the reader prefers the most
parsimonious story representation over less parsimonious
ones, that is, the representation which includes the fewest
goal inferences to account for the actions in the story.
This is true even when it requires the reader to do the
extra work of replacing one of its own previous inferences,
as in example [2] .
4i0 CATEGORIES OF ERRONEOUS INFERENCES
.4.1 SqMS.
ARTHUR is capable of recognizing and correcting
erroneous context inferences in order to maintain a
parsimonious explanation of a story. The examples given so
far have dealt only with erroneous goal inferences, but
other conceptual categories of inferences can be generated
erroneously as well. In this section, examples of other
classes of erroneous inferences will be given, and it will
be shown why each different class presents its own unique
difficulties to ARTHUR'S correction processes.
4.2 Plans and scripts
Consider the following simple story;
[3] Carl was bored. He picked up the newspaper. He
reached under it to get the tennis racket that the
newspaper had been covering.
This is an example in which ARTHUR correctly infers the goal
of the story character, but erroneously infers the plan that
he is going to perform in service of his goal. ARTHUR first
infers that Carl will read the newspaper to alleviate his
boredom, but this inference fails to explain why Carl then
gets his tennis racket. ARTHUR at this point attempts to
supplant the initial goal inference, but in this case ARTHUR
knows that that goal was correctly inferred, because it was
implicitly stated in the first sentence of the story (that
Carl was bored). Hence ARTHUR infers instead that it
erroneously inferred the plan by which Carl intended to
satisfy his goal (reading the newspaper). Rather, Carl
planned to alleviate his boredom by playing tennis.
The problem now is to connect Carl's action of picking
up the newspaper with his plan of playing tennis. Instead
of using the newspaper as a functional object (in this case,
reading material), Carl has treated it as an instrumental
object that must be moved as a precondition to the
implementation of his intended plan. (Preconditions are
discussed in Schank and Abelson [1977]). ARTHUR recognizes
that an object can be used either functionally or
instrumentally. Furthermore, when an action is performed as
a precondition to a plan, typically the objects used in the
action are used instrumentally, as in [3]. ARTHUR'S initial
inference about Carl's plan was based on the functionality
of a newspaper. It is able to supplant this inference by an
inference that Carl instead used the newspaper
instrumentally, as a precondition to getting to his tennis
racket, which in turn was a presumed precondition to using
the racket to play tennis with. Hence, correcting this
erroneous plan inference required ARTHUR to re-evaluate its
inference about the intended use of a functional object.
4.3 Causal state changes
Consider the following example:
[4] Kathy and Chris were playing golf. Kathy hit a
shot deep into the rough.
We assume that Kathy did not intend to hit her ball into the
rough, since she's playing golf, which implies that she
probably has a goal of winning or at least playing well.
Her action, therefore, is probably not goal-oriented
behavior, but is accidental; that is, it is an action which
causally results in some state which may have an effect on
her goal.
This situation differs from stories like [1], [2] and
[3], in that ARTHUR does not change its mind about its
inference of Kathy's goal. Rather than assuming that the
goal inference was erroneous, ARTHUR infers that the causal
result state hinders the achievement of Kathy's goal. Any
causal state which affects a character's goal, either
positively or negatively, appears in ARTHUR'S story
representation in one of the following four relationships to
an existing goals
1 - the state helps the achievement of the goal;
2 - the state hinders achievement of the goal;
3 - the state achieves the goal entirely; or
4 - the state thwarts the goal entirely.
If ARTHUR did assume that Kathy's shot was intentional, then
the concomitant inference is that she didn't really want to
win the game at all; or, in other words, that the initial
inference was erroneous. This is the case in the following
example:
[5] Kathy and Chris were playing golf. Kathy hit a
shot deep into the rough. She wanted to let her
good friend Chris win the game.
Understanding this story requires ARTHUR first to infer that
Kathy intends to win the game; then to notice that her
action has hindered her goal, and finally to recognize that
the initial goal inference was erroneous, and to supplant it
by the inference that Kathy actually intended to lose the
game, not win it.
4.4 Tt^yeHjlpg down the garden path ...
If the correct context inference for a story remains
unknown until some significant fraction of the story has
been read, the story can be thought of as a "garden path"
story. This term is borrowed from so-called garden path
sentences. in which the correct representation of the
sentence is not resolved until relatively late in the
sentence. We will call a garden path story any story which
causes the reader to generte an initial inference which
turns out to be erroneous on the basis of subsequent story
events. Obvious examples of garden path stories are those
in which we experience a surprise ending, e.g., mystery
stories, jokes, fables.
Since ARTHUR operates by generating tentative initial
inferences and then re-evaluating those inferences in light
of subsequent information, ARTHUR understands simple garden
path stories. Npt all garden path stories cause us to
experience surprise. For example, many readers of story [2]
do not notice that Mary might have been planning to read the
magazine, unless that intermediate inference is pointed out
to them. Hence we hypothesize that the processes involved
in understanding stories with surprise endings must differ
from the processes of understanding other garden path
stories. Hence, ARTHUR'S understanding mechanism is not
entirely psychologically plausible in that it does not
differentiate between stories with surprise endings and
other garden path stories.
A more sophisticated version of ARTHUR (call it
"Macro-ARTHUR") might differentiate between "strong" default
inferences and "weak" tentative inferences when generating
an initial context inference. If a strong initial inference
is generated, then MacARTHUR would consciously "notice" this
inference being supplanted, thereby experiencing surprise
that the inference was incorrect. Conversely, if the
initial inference is weak, MacARTHUR may not commit itself
to that inference, but rather may choose to keep around
other possible alternatives. In this case MacARTHUR would
only experience further specification of the initial
tentative set of inferences, rather than supplanting a
single strong inference. The question of when readers
processes consciously versus unconsciously is still an open
question in psychology. Future psychological studies of the
cognitive phenomena underlying human story understanding
(such as in Thorndyke [1976], [1977], Norman and Bobrow
[1975], and Hayes-Roth [1977], to name a few) may be able to
provide data which will shed further light on this issue.
5.0 CONCLUSIONS; WHERE WE'VE BEEN/ WHERE WE'RE HEADING
5.1 Process and representation in understanding
This paper has presented a process for building story
representations which contain inferences not explicitly
stated in the story. The representations themselves are not
new; they are based on those presented by Schank and
Abelson [1977]. What is new here is the process of arriving
at a story representation. Most contextual understanders
(e.g. Charniak [1975], Cullingford [1978], Wilensky [1978])
would fail to arrive at the correct story representations
for any of the examples in this paper, because initial
statements in the examples trigger inferences which prove to
be erroneous in light of subsequent story statements.
ARTHUR'S processing of these examples shows that arriving at
a given story representation may require the reader to
generate a number of intermediate inferences which get
discarded along the way, and which therefore play no role in
the final representation of the story.
Thus a final story representation may not completely
specify the process by which it was generated, since there
may have been intermediate inferences which are not
contained in the final representation. Yet we know that
when people have understood one of these examples, they can
express these intermediate inferences with phrases like "At
first I thought X, but actually it's Y." ARTHUR keeps track
of its intermediate inferences while understanding a story,
and maintains an "inference-fate graph" containing all
inferences generated during story processing, whether they
end up in the final story representation or not.
The point here is that the relationship between a given
story representation on the one hand, and the process of
arriving at that representation on the other, may be far
from straightforward. The path to a final story
representation may involve sidetracks and spurious
inferences which must be recognized and corrected.
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Therefore, specifying the representations corresponding to
natural language inputs is not enough for a theory of
natural language processing; such a theory must also
include descriptions of the processes by which a final
representation is constructed. ARTHUR has demonstrated one
area in which specification of process and representation
diverge; the area of correcting erroneous inferences during
understanding. Further work will be directed towards
specifying other conditions under which process and
representation are not straightforwardly related in natural
language tasks.
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